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Abstract: This paper investigates the degree of market power in the Greek manufacturing 
and service industries over the period 1970-2007. The markup model developed by Hall 
(1988) and Roeger (1995) is taken into consideration where market power is expressed as the 
difference between the selling price and the marginal cost of production. The analysis will be 
conducted in three steps; the first step estimates the price-cost margin of the manufacturing 
and services industries over 1970-2007; the second step applies the cross section specification 
under which the markup ratio is obtained for the 23 manufacturing and 26 service 2-digit 
ISIC sectors of the panel sample; and the third step estimates the price-cost margin of the 
manufacturing and services industries for each year over 1973-2007 by employing the Hall-
Roeger time series specification. The empirical findings suggest that both industries exert a 
positive markup ratio; however, the service industry appears to be less competitive than the 
manufacturing industry. 
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1. Introduction 
The Greek markets have been criticized over the years because of their imperfect competitive 
structure. In particular, the European Commission and the OECD are in favour of boosting 
competition in the most influential markets of any economy. If competition is enhanced, then 
social welfare will tend to be equal to the optimal level proposed by perfect competition. 
Thereby, the markets will be operating efficiently by utilizing the production capabilities of 
the firms to their fullest. The European Commission (2012) has announced the formulation of 
a policy framework under which the European Union members can reach new growth levels 
by developing fully integrated networks. The main intention of this framework is similar to 
the Single Market Mechanism (SEM) which was introduced in 1987. It corresponds to the 
facilitation of an efficient market structure in which the setting price of the firms will tend to 
be equal to their marginal cost. 
 Moreover, the OECD (2012) provides evidence that the Greek markets are the most 
heavily regulated within the OECD members due to a number of legislations that do not 
allow competition to flourish. They impose a number of restrictions, such as barriers to entry 
or very high fixed costs that discourage new firms to enter the market, thus providing the 
incumbent firms with market power. The main argument of the aforementioned reports is that 
competition results in increased output growth by enhancing economic activity. Consequently, 
increased production will lead to additional employment which will boost gross national 
income and the purchasing power parity of consumers.  
If this happens, then firms will gain more revenue due to increased sales and 
innovation will be used as a tool of competition. For this reason, there is a need of particular 
indicators expressed in terms of pricing and production decisions that can identify the degree 
of market power in various industries and sectors. In this context, the price-cost margin can 
be used as an indicator of price markup over the cost of inputs, such as intermediate inputs, 
labour and capital. As a result, whenever the price level exceeds the marginal cost of inputs, 
there is a degree of market power reflected by a higher price level compared to the optimal 
level of perfect competition.  
The methodology provided by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995) will be employed in 
this study in order to identify the market structure of the two most influential industries of the 
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Greek economy: the service and the manufacturing industry3. This methodology is known as 
the Hall-Roeger approach, under which the nominal growth rate of the Solow residual is 
independent of the growth rate of nominal capital productivity. Under perfect competition, 
the growth rate of value added must be equal to the growth rate of inputs. This equality is 
significant for market efficiency because it provides consumers with higher product quality as 
a result of lower prices and higher innovation (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2013). However, if the 
former growth rate exceeds the latter, the market is characterized by imperfect competition. 
This happens because the price level is higher compared to the one of perfect competition, 
thus resulting in under-production. 
This study applies the Hall-Roeger approach in the Greek manufacturing and service 
industries under a three-step approach as introduced by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011). The first 
step concerns the estimation of the price-cost margin in both industries over the period 1970-
2007. The second step employs the cross section specification by identifying the price 
markup in the 23 manufacturing and the 26 service 2-digit ISIC sectors of the panel data set 
individually. Lastly, the third step employs the time series specification through the 
estimation of the price cost margin of both industries for each year over 1973-2007. 
Consequently, this study aims to complement the findings of Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011, 
2012a, 2012b, 2013) and Polemis (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) of the degree of market power in the 
Greek manufacturing and service sectors.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the literature review of the 
price cost margin approach; Section 3 develops the model formulation; Section 4 presents the 
methodology; Section 5 provides and discusses the empirical findings; and section 6 offers a 
conclusion. 
2. Literature review 
An important contribution to the price-cost margin literature was made by Hall (1988) under 
the assumption that markets are perfectly competitive when the price level is equal to the 
marginal cost of the firms. When the price level is higher, the market structure is considered 
to be uncompetitive. However, while the price level is observable, the marginal production 
cost of the firms may not be known. As a result, Hall overcame this drawback by showing 
that the nominal growth rate of the Solow residual is independent of the growth rate of 
                                                          
3 The service industry contributes to Greek annual nominal GDP by approximately 80.4%, while the 
manufacturing industry contributes by 15.8% (World Bank, 2016). 
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nominal capital productivity. The price-cost margin approach was applied in the United 
States manufacturing industry and provided evidence of market power as the price level was 
higher than the marginal cost of production.  
In particular, Solow (1957) introduced the concept of residual in the production 
process by taking into account a production function which allowed technical change to be 
included along with the inputs of labour and capital. By applying this formulation in the 
United States over 1909-1949, where output per hour approximately increased by 100%, he 
found that 12.5% of the increment in labour productivity could be attributed to increase 
capital per hour. However, the remaining 77.5% is explained by different factors than labour 
and capital accumulation which refer to the Solow residual. For this reason, the calculation of 
such unobserved shocks may not be feasible and thus, they may restrict the calculation of the 
price-cost margin.  
Nevertheless, Roeger (1995) expanded this framework by taking into consideration 
the difference between the production-based (primal) Solow Residual (PRS) and the cost-
based (dual) Solow Residual (DSR). This formulation is used in order to eliminate the 
unobservable shock of productivity and thus, obtain an unbiased estimate of market power. 
The indicator of market power is reflected by the difference between the growth rate of value 
added and the growth rate of inputs. Consequently, this is the final form of the markup 
equation which is employed by many studies over a number of industries in various 
economies. 
In particular, there have been several studies that utilize the Hall-Roeger approach in 
order to test the degree of market power in the United States manufacturing industry. Shapiro 
(1987) and Norrbin (1993) found evidence in favour of markups consistent with oligopolistic 
pricing decisions as the manufacturing firms have been operating under imperfect 
competitive conduct. Bhuyan and Lopez (1998) validated such results for the United States 
food and tobacco sectors. They found that the price-cost margin resulted in oligopoly-induced 
allocative efficiency losses equal to 5% of sales over 1987. On the other hand, Mazumder 
(2014) contradicts such findings by employing a generalized version of the Hall-Roeger 
approach. The new version includes a relaxation of the assumption that labour can be 
adjusted at a fixed wage rate at no cost. The results support the presence of countercyclical 
and decreasing price-cost margins since the 1960s because the main factor influencing this 
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measure is the share of imports in this industry. As a result of increasing foreign competition, 
the price level fell, thus converging to the one of perfect competition. 
Moreover, Martins et al. (1996) applied the Hall-Roeger approach in 14 OECD 
manufacturing industries over the period 1970-1992. The model took into account output in 
terms of gross value added and for this reason, the variable of intermediate inputs was added 
in the cost function. The findings support the presence of positive and significant markups 
across the industries, thus verifying the presence of imperfect competition. Bloch and Olive 
(2003) investigated the presence of markups in the manufacturing industries of the United 
Kingdom, the United States, Germany and Japan over 1970-1991. The evidence rejected the 
markup model in many industries; however, a positive relationship between the price-cost 
margin and the level of industrial concentration was identified. Concentrated industries are 
more likely to exhibit higher markups which are influenced by competing foreign prices. As a 
result, markups are either pro-cyclical or a-cyclical. 
 Görg and Warzynski (2003) studied the markup behaviour of the United Kingdom 
manufacturing industry over 1990-1996. The results provided evidence that exporting firms 
tend to exhibit higher markups than non-exporting firms. In addition, higher markups also 
depend on the degree of product differentiation. In sectors with homogenous products the 
price-cost margin tends to be lower compared to sectors with differentiated products. Boyle 
(2004) estimated the price-cost margin of the Irish manufacturing sectors over 1991-1999. 
The sample was differentiated into output-oriented and input–oriented sources of market 
power. The findings do not support the presence of imperfect competition in output-based 
markets; however, there is strong evidence of imperfect competitive conduct in certain input-
based markets. Dobrinsky et al. (2004) applied the Hall-Roeger approach to a panel of 
Hungarian and Bulgarian manufacturing firms over 1974-1990. They found evidence that 
support the presence of positive markups associated with production technology and scales of 
economy.  
 In addition, Dobbelaere (2004) studied the markup behaviour of the Belgian 
manufacturing firms over 1988-1995. The product and labour markets were taken into 
account in order to investigate the degree of heterogeneity in the price markup and the 
bargaining power of unions. The results indicate that the inclusion of the labour market in the 
analysis of the product market is essential as the value of markup is underestimated when the 
study of the latter market is conducted independently. Consequently, sectors with higher 
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labour bargaining power tend to exhibit higher price-cost margins. Wilhelmsson (2006) 
investigated the degree of market power in the Swedish food and beverages sector over 1990-
2002 and the effects imposed by the competitive forces of the European sectors. The 
estimates show that many firms exhibit positive price-cost margins; however, increased 
competition from the European Union sectors resulted in reduced market power. Thereby, 
foreign competition had a negative effect on the markup level of domestic firms. 
 In a relevant study, Molnár (2010) estimated the price-cost margin for the 
manufacturing and service industries of Slovenia over 1993-2006. The estimates conclude 
that the price-cost margin appears to be higher on average in the service than the 
manufacturing sectors. Similar results were obtained by Molnár and Bottini (2010) for a 
number of OECD European countries over 1993-2006. The estimated markups tend to be 
higher for particular sectors, such as real estate and professional service and lower for sectors 
such as retail and wholesale trade. Moreover, the forces of competition appear to be more 
persistent in the sectors of the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, except 
Sweden, and lower in Central European countries (see Polemis, 2014c).  
Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2012) also formed a panel set of European countries 
and investigated the markup ratio to identify the degree of market power. As in the previous 
study, the average markup ratio in the service industry is higher compared to the 
manufacturing industry, thus concluding that the service sectors are more flexible exercising 
their market power on the price level. Noria (2013) investigated the effect of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement on the price-cost margin of the Mexican manufacturing 
sectors over 1994-2003. The findings support the fall of that margin in 1994 as an immediate 
interaction to foreign competition, but its pattern is uncertain over the following years. The 
author differentiates the sample into sectors that were liberalized in 10 years and sectors that 
were liberalized in 5 years. Competition was more intense in the former group by forcing 
those sectors to adjust the price level to their marginal cost of production. On the other hand, 
the market structure of the latter group remained imperfectly competitive due to various 
domestic factors. 
 Similar studies have been performed for the Greek manufacturing and service 
industries by employing the Hall-Roeger approach. Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 
2013) investigated the price-cost margin in the Greek food and beverages sector and the 
manufacturing industry overall. The findings support the presence of positive and significant 
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markups in every sector and every year over 1984-2007. In addition, Polemis (2014a, 2014b, 
2014c) provides a similar analysis for the Greek manufacturing and service industries over 
1970-2007. The results validate the presence of positive markups in both industries, thus 
confirming the presence of imperfect competition. 
 Overall, the aforementioned studies conclude that the majority of the constituent 
industries and sectors exhibit a degree of market power expressed in terms of positive price-
cost margins. This means that the price level exceeds the marginal cost of production, thus 
allowing firms to enjoy positive profit levels through under-production. As a result, the 
degree of social efficiency is not at its optimal level as consumer surplus is exploited by firms. 
In this context, the Hall-Roeger approach provides a sufficient empirical tool of analysis that 
allows the investigation of market power in several industries. 
3. Model formulation and data 
The approach employed in this study corresponds to the model developed by Hall (1988) and 
extended by Roeger (1995) in order to provide an unbiased estimate of market power. In 
particular, an industry is assumed that produces output (𝑦𝑡) according to a homogeneous 
production function 𝑓 using three inputs: intermediate inputs (𝑚𝑡)
4, labour (𝑙𝑡) and capital 
(𝑘𝑡) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝜃𝑡𝑓(𝑚𝑡, 𝑙𝑡, 𝑘𝑡)                                                                                                                 (1) 
where 𝜃𝑡 is an index of total factor productivity (Hicks neutral productivity term) reflecting 
technological progress and t denotes the time interval. Any output variation is independent of 
input fluctuations through disembodied changes in technology. According to such production 
function, Hall (1988) showed that the production-based (primal) Solow Residual can be 
defined as the difference between output and input growth weighted by their shares in total 
value added. However, in this study, output is expressed in terms of gross output and thus, 
total value added is replaced by this measure. For this reason, the variable of intermediate 
inputs is included in the production function in order to avoid biased overestimated markup 
values.  
                                                          
4 In this study, the parameter of intermediate inputs refers to the goods and services used in the production 
process to produce the final good or service for consumption. Raw materials, energy, and semi-finished goods 
can be considered as some of those inputs. 
8 
 
The main assumptions of this formulation are (i) constant returns to scale, (ii) 
imperfect competition in product markets, and (iii) perfect competition in the input markets. 
Therefore, the Solow Residual for this study is given by 
𝑆𝑅 =
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
− 𝑎𝑚𝑡
𝛥𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡
− 𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝛥𝑙𝑡
𝑙𝑡
− (1 − 𝑎𝑚𝑡 − 𝑎𝑙𝑡)
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 
      
       = 𝐿𝐼𝑡 (
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
−
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
) + (1 − 𝐿𝐼𝑡)
𝛥𝜃𝑡
𝜃𝑡
                                                                                           (2) 
where 𝑎𝑚𝑡 = 𝑝𝑚𝑡𝑚𝑡 𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡⁄  is the share of intermediate inputs in gross output, 𝑝𝑚𝑡 refers to 
the price of intermediate inputs, 𝑎𝑙𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡𝑙𝑡 𝑝𝑡𝑦𝑡⁄  is the share of labour in gross output, 𝑤𝑡 
corresponds to the wage rate and 𝑝𝑡 is the price level of output. The coefficient 𝐿𝐼𝑡 is the 
Lerner index that measures the market power of the industry and it is expressed as 𝐿𝐼𝑡 =
(𝑝𝑡 − 𝑚𝑐𝑡) 𝑝𝑡⁄ = 1 (1 − 𝜇𝑡)⁄ , where 𝑚𝑐𝑡  is the marginal cost of production and 𝜇𝑡  is the 
price markup over marginal cost5. However, the estimation of 𝐿𝐼𝑡 is problematic in equation 
(2) due to the presence of correlation between the measure of productivity growth and the 
error term, thus resulting in biased and inconsistent markup estimates. This weakness was 
identified by Roeger (1995) who pointed out that the difference between the change in price 
and the weighted change in factor input prices must be taken into consideration. By applying 
this formulation, one obtains 
𝐷𝑆𝑅 = 𝑎𝑚𝑡
𝛥𝑝𝑚𝑡
𝑝𝑚𝑡
+ 𝑎𝑙𝑡
𝛥𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡
+ (1 − 𝑎𝑚𝑡 − 𝑎𝑙𝑡)
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
−
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
 
         
         = −𝐿𝐼𝑡 (
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
−
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
) + (1 − 𝐿𝐼𝑡)
𝛥𝜃𝑡
𝜃𝑡
                                                                                     (3) 
where ut is the rental cost of capital. By subtracting (3) from (2) the productivity shock 𝜃𝑡 is 
cancelled out, thus obtaining 
(
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) − 𝑎𝑚𝑡 (
𝛥𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑚𝑡
𝑝𝑚𝑡
) −  𝑎𝑙𝑡 (
𝛥𝑙𝑡
𝑙𝑡
+
𝛥𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡
) − (1 − 𝑎𝑚𝑡 − 𝑎𝑙𝑡) ( 
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
) = 
= 𝐿𝐼𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)]                                                                                                (4) 
                                                          
5 When the Lerner index is equal to zero, the industry is under perfect competition because 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡. A value 
over 0 < 𝐿𝐼 < 1 indicates non-competitive conditions and lastly, a value equal to unity denotes monopoly. 
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This is the final equation provided by Roeger (1995) that reflects the degree of market power. 
By re-arranging the terms, it follows 
(
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
) = 𝜇𝑡{𝑎𝑚𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑚𝑡
𝑝𝑚𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)] + 
       
                                                                   𝑎𝑙𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑙𝑡
𝑙𝑡
+
𝛥𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)]}                                 (5) 
This is the main formulation developed and utilized by Rezitis and Kalantzi (2011) 
and it is the markup equation which is going to be employed in the present study. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that  
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = (
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝑦𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑡
𝑝𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)                                                                                               (5a) 
𝛥𝑋𝑡 = 𝑎𝑚𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑚𝑡
𝑚𝑡
+
𝛥𝑝𝑚𝑡
𝑝𝑚𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)] + 𝑎𝑙𝑡 [(
𝛥𝑙𝑡
𝑙𝑡
+
𝛥𝑤𝑡
𝑤𝑡
) − (
𝛥𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡
+
𝛥𝑢𝑡
𝑢𝑡
)]          (5b) 
 
where 𝛥𝑌𝑡 reflects the growth rate of gross output per unit of capital, and 𝛥𝑋𝑡 is the growth 
rate of intermediate inputs and labour expenses per unit of capital. Moreover, according to 
this formulation, when the value of the price-cost margin 𝜇𝑡  is equal to unity, the market 
structure is perfectly competitive because the growth rate of gross output is equal to the 
growth rate of inputs. A value above unity shows that the industry sets a price level higher 
than the marginal cost of production and thus, it is described by imperfectly competitive 
conduct. 
 Consequently, the first step of the analysis will estimate equation (5) for the 
manufacturing and service industries over 1970-2007 in order to obtain the price-cost margin 
at the aggregate level. For simplicity, equation (5) is also expressed as 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = 𝜇𝛥𝑋𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                                     (6) 
where 𝜇 reflects the price-cost margin of the aggregated manufacturing and service industry 
respectively over 1970-2007. The estimated parameter takes into account the whole panel of 
manufacturing and service sectors separately in order to obtain an aggregate estimation for 
both industries. 
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The second step of the analysis will employ the cross section specification of the Hall-
Roeger approach by identifying the price-cost margin of the constituent manufacturing and 
service sectors individually over 1970-2007. Thereby, equation (6) is transformed into 
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝜇𝑖𝐷𝑆𝑖𝛥𝑋𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                      (7) 
where 𝜇𝑖 is the markup ratio of each 2-digit sector i for both industries and DSi is a cross 
section dummy variable (i=1,..,N denotes the number of the constituent sectors) which is set 
to unity for sector i and zero otherwise. This variable allows for the estimation of individual 
effects reflected by the manufacturing and service sectors on the price-cost margin.  
 The third and last step of the analysis refers to the time series specification of the 
Hall-Roeger approach. It provides evidence of the markup level of the aggregate industry for 
each year over 1973-2007. As a result, equation (6) is transformed into  
𝛥𝑌𝑡 = ∑ 𝜇𝑡𝐷𝑇𝑡𝛥𝑋𝑡
2007
𝑡=1973 + 𝜀𝑡                                                                                                 (8) 
where 𝜇𝑡 is the annual markup ratio estimated for the manufacturing and service industries 
separately over 1973-2007 and 𝐷𝑇𝑡 is a time dummy variable (t=1973,…,2007 is the number 
of years) which is set to unity for year t and zero otherwise. This specification will identify 
the markup value for each year individually for the manufacturing and service industries.  
The data set is obtained from the EU KLEMS6, the AMECO and the World Bank 
database. The sample comprises of 23 2-digit ISIC manufacturing sectors and 26 2-digit ISIC 
service sectors over the period 1970-2007 as presented in Table A in appendix.  The 
interpretation of the variables included in equations (6), (7) and (8) is as follows: 𝑝𝑡 and 𝑦𝑡 
reflect gross output price and volume indices respectively (1995=100), 𝑝𝑚𝑡 and 𝑚𝑡 are the 
intermediate inputs price and volume indices (1995=100), 𝑙𝑡 is the number of employees, 𝑤𝑡 
is the labour cost expressed in terms of the compensation of employees and 𝑘𝑡 is the capital 
compensation at basic current prices. The observations of these variables were obtained 
directly by the EU-KLEMS database. On the other hand, the rental cost of capital 𝑢𝑡 is 
obtained by  
𝑢𝑡 = [(𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒) + 𝛿]𝐹𝑡                                                                                                             (9) 
                                                          
6 The EU-KLEMS project aims to create a complete database of economic measures of the manufacturing and 
service sectors for EU members and the US, Japan and Canada. Some of those measures refer to production, 
economic growth, capital formulation, labour compensation and gross output. For more information see 
http://www.euklems.net.    
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where  (𝑖 − 𝜋𝑒) reflects the real interest rate, 𝐹𝑡 is the deflator of fixed asset investment and 𝛿 
is the depreciation rate which is fixed at 5% across all sectors (Martins et al., 1996). The 
observations were obtained by the AMECO and the World Bank database and have been 
fixed for all manufacturing and service sectors. 
4. Methodology 
The estimation process of the aforementioned equations takes into account the fixed 
and random effects models in order to identify the individual effects in the panel sample. 
According to Baltagi (2001), a general case of a one-way linear unobserved individual effects 
model for N individual observations and T dated periods has the following form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝑛𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, for i=1,…,N and t=1,...,T                                                                        (10) 
where yit is the dependent variable for individual i and time t, α denotes the overall constant 
term of this regression, X’it represents the transpose time variant regressors’ vector (1xk), ni 
corresponds to the time invariant individual effects term which also addresses the cross-
section effects (random or fixed) and eit is the idiosyncratic error term. Unlike the vector of 
regressors X’it, the time invariant individual effect ni cannot be easily estimated (i.e. due to 
historical or institutional factors). The fixed effects model considers that the heterogeneous 
individual effects term is correlated with the vector of regressors. Since ni cannot be 
controlled directly, the fixed effects model demeans equation (10) by using the following 
transformation 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖 = (𝑋
′
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋′̅̅ ̅𝑖)𝛽 + (𝑛𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝑒𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)                                                                  (11) 
where  ?̅?𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 , 𝑋′̅𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑋′𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1  and  ?̅?𝑖 =
1
𝑇
∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1 . Since the time invariant 
individual effect is fixed, the difference from its mean will be zero and thus, its effect from 
equation (10) is eliminated.  
On the other hand, a simple random effects model has the following form 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑖 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡, for i=1,…,N and t=1,...,T                                                                       (12) 
and 𝛽0𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝑣𝑖  
By substituting the latter into the former equation, one obtains 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋′𝑖𝑡𝛽1 + (𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                                 (13) 
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where yit is the dependent variable for individual i and time t, 𝛽0 denotes the overall constant 
term and X’it represents the transpose time variant vector of regressors (1xk). Those terms can 
be viewed as the fixed part of this model. On the other hand, the random part consists of the 
two terms 𝑣𝑖  and 𝑒𝑖𝑡  which are correlated. In particular, 𝑣𝑖  is the individual effect for each 
sector i=1,…,N, which is not correlated with X’it and allows for differential intercepts over 
the given time sample and 𝑒𝑖𝑡   corresponds to the error term. As a result, the random effects 
model is preferable to the fixed effects model when correlation emerges between the 
individual effects and the error term of the model. Such effects can be captured by parameter 
𝑣𝑖 and test whether the fixed or the random effects model is more suitable. 
5. Empirical results 
The estimation process of the manufacturing and service industries is conducted in three steps 
under which the Hall-Roeger approach is applied. The first step estimates the price-cost 
margin of both industries by aggregating the panel sample; the second step provides the 
markup values for each manufacturing and service sector individually over 1970-2007; and 
the third step presents the results of industrial pricing decisions for each year over 1973-2007. 
This process will provide evidence about the degree of market power in the constituent 
industries and sectors and whether the findings suggest imperfect competitive conduct. 
 
Table 1: Diagnostic test results of the three Hall-Roeger approaches for the Greek manufacturing and 
service sectors. 
Manufacture Hall-Roeger 
model (6) 
 Hall-Roeger 
cross sectional 
model (7) 
 Hall-Roeger 
time series 
model (8) 
Estimation 
technique 
FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
Breusch and 
Pagan test 
(LM)a 
1334.65** 
[0.000] 
 1266.621 ** 
[0.000] 
 1323.981** 
[0.000] 
Hausman testb 3.940* 
[0.0471] 
 201.958** 
[0.0000] 
 - 
White testc 117.026** 
[0.0000] 
 239.907**  
[0.0000] 
 69.003** 
[0.0000] 
Breusch and 
Godfrey test 
(LM)d 
130.594**  
[0.000] 
 113.896** 
[0.0000] 
 - 
R-squared 0.993  0.997  0.985 
Service      
Estimation 
technique 
FGLS  FGLS  FGLS 
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Breusch and 
Pagan test 
(LM)a 
474.111** 
[0.000] 
 1288.703** 
[0.000] 
 632.011** 
[0.000] 
Hausman testb 51.651** 
[0.0000] 
 158.221** 
[0.000] 
 - 
White testc 108.182** 
[0.0000] 
 168.201** 
[0.0000] 
 61.935** 
[0.0000] 
Breusch and 
Godfrey test 
(LM)d 
75.164** 
[0.0000] 
 103.078** 
[0.0000] 
 - 
R-squarede 0.968  0.991  0.966 
Notes: The numbers in brackets indicate p-values. 
a H0: Cross sectional independence (OLS) versus H1: Cross sectional dependence (Random Effects Model). 
b H0: Random Effects Model versus H1: Fixed Effects Model. 
c H0: Homoskedasticity versus H1: Heteroskedasticity of unknown form. 
d H0: No serial correlation versus H1: Serial correlation of at least k=4 order. 
e 𝑅2 = 1 − ∑(𝑦 − ?̂?)/ ∑ 𝑦2 as discussed by Kvålseth (1985), where 𝑦 is the dependent variable and ?̂? denotes 
the fitted value of 𝑦. 
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 Table 1 presents the diagnostic tests for each estimated equation under the three step 
procedure. The first test corresponds to the Breusch and Pagan LM test (Bresuch and Pagan, 
1980) for the identification of cross section dependency in the panel sample. The results 
suggest that the three Hall-Roeger specifications for both industries are subject to such 
dependency, thus preventing the use of the pooled OLS estimation technique due to this form 
of contemporaneous correlation. In addition, the fixed effects model is formulated using the 
dummy variables least squares technique (LSDV); while the random effects model is 
estimated using the generalized least squares (GLS) in order to take into consideration the 
presence of correlation between the individual effects and the error term. Therefore, the 
Hausman test (Wu, 1973; Hausman, 1978) is employed in order to identify which model is 
best suited under the null hypothesis that the individual effects are not correlated with the 
explanatory variables. Moreover, White’s test (White, 1980) and the Breusch and Godfrey 
LM test (Bresuch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978) are used in order to identify the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the panel data sample. 
 According to the results, the three specifications for both industries are estimated 
using the fixed effects model. However, given the presence of heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation, the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) estimation technique is applied in 
order to take into consideration those problems.  
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Table 2: Aggregate, cross sectional and time series markup estimations for the Greek manufacturing 
sectors. 
Parameters Hall-Roeger 
model 
Parameters Hall-Roeger 
cross-sectional 
model 
Parameters Hall-Roeger 
time-series 
model 
μ 1.180** 
(406.69) 
μ15 1.135** 
(221.96) 
μ1973 1.176** 
(66.33) 
  μ16 1.554** 
(149.52) 
μ1974 1.170** 
(14.97) 
  μ17 1.220** 
(130.46) 
μ1975 1.177** 
(73.47) 
  μ18 1.315** 
(180.98) 
μ1976 1.174** 
(48.61) 
  μ19 1.307** 
(77.05) 
μ1977 1.174** 
(10.88) 
  μ20 1.354** 
(142.40) 
μ1978 1.177** 
(11.12) 
  μ21 1.111** 
(112.84) 
μ1979 1.175** 
(84.81) 
  μ22 1.197** 
(104.82) 
μ1980 1.177** 
(104.05) 
  μ23 1.152** 
(180.29) 
μ1981 1.169** 
(65.17) 
  μ24 1.139** 
(132.92) 
μ1982 1.164** 
(93.17) 
  μ25 1.153** 
(139.25) 
μ1983 1.181** 
(101.66) 
  μ26 1.179** 
(83.57) 
μ1984 1.148** 
(42.17) 
  μ27 1.121** 
(260.64) 
μ1985 1.083** 
(22.12) 
 
 
 μ28 1.194** 
(190.88) 
μ1986 1.180** 
(14.10) 
  μ29 1.113** 
(289.53) 
μ1987 - 
  μ30 1.340** 
(40.33) 
μ1988 - 
  μ31 1.154** 
(68.27) 
μ1989 - 
  μ32 1.194** 
(112.77) 
μ1990 1.183** 
(128.80) 
  μ33 1.134** 
(103.29) 
μ1991 1.164** 
(161.84) 
  μ34 1.072** 
(228.90) 
μ1992 1.163** 
(95.87) 
  μ35 1.140** 
(63.80) 
μ1993 1.093** 
(28.78629) 
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  μ36 1.447** 
(48.13) 
μ1994 1.135** 
(15.44) 
  μ37 - μ1995 1.193** 
(21.24) 
    μ1996 1.151** 
(36.01) 
    μ1997 1.182** 
(67.78) 
    μ1998 1.212**  
(52.23) 
    μ1999 1.121** 
(30.89) 
    μ2000 1.146** 
(50.26) 
    μ2001 1.263** 
(53.83) 
    μ2002 1.215** 
(74.42) 
    μ2003 1.244** 
(60.13) 
    μ2004 1.201** 
(59.42) 
    μ2005 1.120** 
(31.91) 
    μ2006 1.212** 
(62.69) 
    μ2007 1.096** 
(45.83) 
Notes: The values in parentheses are t-statistics. “-“ denotes lack of observations in some variables. 
* Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 The estimated markups for the manufacturing industry are presented in Table 2. The 
price-cost margin is equal to 1.180. A value equal to unity suggests that the growth rate of 
gross output is equal to the growth rate of inputs and thus, the price level is equal to the 
marginal cost of production. The value of the manufacturing industry shows that the price 
level exceeds the marginal cost of production by 18% over 1970-2007. As a result, the 
industry has been operating under imperfect competitive conduct charging a higher price 
level compared to the one of perfect competition. 
 The results of the cross section specification are presented in the second column. This 
particular specification allows the inclusion of cross section individual effects in the panel 
sample to identify the price markup of each sector according to the value of the whole 
industry. The values range over 1.072-1.554 suggesting that all manufacturing sectors exert a 
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positive price markup, thus operating under imperfect competitive conditions. The lowest 
values are obtained by the sectors of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (i.e. 34), of 
pulp paper and paper (i.e. 21) and of other machinery products (i.e. 29). The highest values 
are estimated for the sectors of tobacco (i.e. 16), of other manufacturing products (i.e. 36) and 
of wood and cork (i.e. 20). This shows that the markup ratio of the manufacturing sectors is 
similar to the value of the aggregate industry. The difference between those values may be 
due to the number of firms operating in each sector and/or their ability to innovate. It is 
expected that sectors with a limited number of firms will tend to be more oligopolistic 
compared to sectors with many firms. Also, innovating firms will have the option to charge a 
higher price level as a result of increasing the quality of their products, thus rendering them 
more attractive to both domestic and foreign markets7. 
 However, in order to conclude that the manufacturing industry operates under 
imperfect competition, we must also estimate the price-cost margin for each year individually. 
For this reason, the Hall-Roeger time series specification is applied on equation (6) to 
identify the annual markup ratios over 1973-2007. 
Figure 1: The price-cost margin of the Greek manufacturing industry over 1973-2007. 
 
Source: Estimations of equation (8). 
 
                                                          
7 Nevertheless, Giokas, Eriotis and Dokas (2015) argue that the capital stock of the Greek manufacturing sectors 
was not improved significantly over 1995-2003. This means that technological progress on average was not the 
main tool of competition. 
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The results are presented in the last column of Table 2 and illustrated in figure 1. Over the 
period 1973-1983 the price-cost margin was quite stable around 1.17. However, in the 
following years (1984-1985) it rapidly fell to 1.08 only to be increased in 1986. An 
interpretation of this behaviour may refer to the introduction of the Single European Market 
(SEM) which was about to be implemented in 1987. For this reason, firms tried to attract 
more customers in the short-run in order to increase their profits. 
 The markup values over the years 1987-1989 are not available given some limitations 
in the rental cost of capital. The Single European Market was gradually implemented in 1987 
and completed in 1992. It can be seen that the market power in 1990 remained the same as in 
the previous years, but it gradually fell up to 1993. This outcome may refer to the successful 
implementation of this framework that enhanced competition in the Greek manufacturing 
industry through free trading networks with the European countries. In addition, in 1993 there 
was an attempt to boost the competitive forces of the manufacturing firms by increasing 
production and reducing the price-cost margins. A number of developmental laws and 
operational programs, such as the “Operational Programme for Research and Technology II” 
and the “Industrial Research Development Programme” contributed to the research and 
technological innovation and infrastructure of the Greek firms (Rezitis and Kalantzi, 2011).  
Over the following years there is an increasing trend in the markup ratio with a 
temporary under-spike in 1999, reaching its climax in 2001. The price level exceeds the 
marginal cost of production by 26% and the main reason of such increase corresponds to the 
introduction of the euro currency in the Greek economy. The new currency resulted in 
additional Purchasing Power Parity for consumers and thus, the manufacturing firms aimed to 
take into advantage additional levels of consumer surplus created by this shock.  
Subsequently, the markup level started to fall, reaching a value equal to 1.20 in 2004, 
under which the hosting of the Olympic Games occurred. Even if domestic and foreign 
demand were boosted over this year, the results show that the price-cost margin did not 
rapidly increase but instead, it remained in a relatively high level. Over the last years, there is 
a significant increase in 2006 but subsequently, the markup ratio was reduced to a level equal 
to 1.09. This outcome may have been caused by the increasing price of intermediate inputs8 
over 2007-2009 and the slow adjustment rate of the price level to such changes. In addition, 
the upcoming financial crisis of 2008 might have rendered the manufacturing firms more 
                                                          
8 Such inputs refer to rotation soybeans, rotation corn and continuous corn. 
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reluctant to acquire additional market power due to future demand uncertainty, even when the 
aggregate economy was growing. 
The evidence presented for the manufacturing industry validate the results of Rezitis 
and Kalantzi (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013) and Polemis (2014a, 2014b, 2014c) about the 
imperfect competitive market structure. The values may vary because of the different data set 
and the underlying methodology but the empirical suggestions point to the direction of 
imperfect competition in the industry. 
 
Table 3: Aggregate, cross-sectional and time series markup estimations for the Greek service sectors 
Parameters Hall-Roeger 
model 
Parameters Hall-Roeger 
cross-sectional 
model 
Parameters Hall-Roeger 
time-series 
model 
μ 1.311** 
(145.92) 
μ50 2.363** 
(85.47) 
μ1973 1.439** 
(24.90) 
  μ51 1.761** 
(132.30) 
μ1974 1.497**  
(6.31) 
  μ52 2.206** 
(151.60) 
μ1975 1.380** 
(30.68) 
  μH 1.833** 
(129.51) 
μ1976 1.444** 
(19.89) 
  μ60 1.517** 
(62.40) 
μ1977 1.066  
(1.30) 
  μ61 1.530** 
(33.51) 
μ1978 1.231**  
(8.13) 
  μ62 1.074** 
(64.10) 
μ1979 1.416** 
(35.31) 
  μ63 1.184** 
(51.38) 
μ1980 1.399** 
(42.45) 
  μ64 1.965** 
(42.32) 
μ1981 1.385** 
(24.18) 
  μ65 1.800** 
(59.61) 
μ1982 1.398** 
(39.17) 
  μ66 0.999** 
(124.19) 
μ1983 1.389** 
(42.03) 
  μ67 2.286** 
(75.89) 
μ1984 1.353** 
(16.24) 
  μ70 10.987** 
(71.32) 
μ1985 1.127** 
(18.42) 
  μ71 2.297** 
(87.41) 
μ1986 1.025** 
(11.11) 
  μ72 1.197** 
(69.98) 
μ1987 - 
  μ73 1.140** 
(58.08) 
μ1988 - 
  μ74 1.840** 
(40.48) 
μ1989 - 
  μ L 0.998** 
(493.34) 
μ1990 1.408** 
(52.49) 
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  μM 1.174** 
(95.56) 
μ1991 1.415** 
(65.16) 
  μN 1.708** 
(91.50) 
μ1992 1.359** 
(42.32) 
  μO 1.545** 
(123.40) 
μ1993 1.118** 
(16.16) 
  μ90 1.367** 
(68.90) 
μ1994 1.214**  
(4.65) 
  μ91 1.231** 
(51.49) 
μ1995 1.201**  
(6.50) 
  μ92 1.451** 
(92.32) 
μ1996 1.049**  
(8.64) 
  μ93 2.385** 
(75.72) 
μ1997 1.393** 
(24.19) 
  μP - μ1998 0.999**  
(8.71) 
    μ1999 1.161** 
(12.65) 
    μ2000 1.458** 
(16.07) 
    μ2001 1.397** 
(24.06) 
    μ2002 1.070**  
(9.78) 
    μ2003 1.293** 
(22.25) 
    μ2004 1.366** 
(19.84) 
    μ2005 1.081**  
(8.19) 
    μ2006 1.337** 
(27.53) 
    μ2007 1.383** 
(14.24) 
Notes: The values in parentheses are t-statistics. “-“ denotes lack of observations in some variables. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
** Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
 
 The markup estimates for the service sectors are presented in Table 3. In particular, 
the value for the service industry is equal to 1.311 denoting that the industry has been 
charging a price level 31% higher than marginal cost over 1970-2007. This value is higher 
compared to the one of the manufacturing industry, thus indicating that the service industry is 
less competitive. This outcome validates the suggestions of several studies, such as Molnár 
(2010) and Molnár and Bottini (2010) in favour of higher markup levels exercised by the 
service industry.  
This argument is also validated by the sectorial estimates obtained under the Hall-
Roeger cross section specification. The values are presented in the second column of Table 3; 
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however, there are sectors with high markup ratios and sectors with markups equal to unity. 
This means that even if the aggregate service industry operates under imperfect competitive 
conduct, there are sectors that behave according to perfect competition. In particular, the 
lowest price-cost margins are estimated for the sectors of insurance and pension funding (i.e. 
66) and of public administration and defence (i.e. L) which are almost equal to unity. This 
outcome suggests that the price level of those sectors corresponds to the marginal cost of 
service provision. The highest values are estimated for the sectors of real estate activities (i.e. 
70), and of other service activities (i.e. 93). The latter values reflect a price level that exceeds 
marginal cost by more than 100% suggesting that the market structure of those sectors is 
highly oligopolistic. These markup ratios may be interpreted according to the degree of 
product differentiation, as service provision is considered to be quite heterogeneous across 
firms and sectors. 
 
Figure 2: The price-cost margin for the Greek service industry over 1973-2007. 
 
Source: Estimations of equation (8). 
 
The third and final step provides the estimates of the service industry for each year 
over 1973-2007. The markup values are presented in the last column of Table 3 and 
illustrated in figure 2.  Unlike the behaviour of the manufacturing industry, the service 
industry experienced more volatile fluctuations in the price-cost margin. In particular, the 
degree of market power is relatively high over the period 1973-1986 where the highest value 
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is observed in 1974. With the exception of 1977, where the markup rate fell rapidly, the 
service industry experienced a stable trend over 1973-1984 with an average value equal to 
1.40. This may be a result of the limited number of firms operating in the industry over that 
period. Consequently, limited competition led to increased price-cost margins due to market 
power acquisition. Over the following years (1985-1986), the price markup fell close to the 
level of perfect competition, but four years later it converged to its average value. Over the 
period 1990-1993, the ratio fell due to the implementation of the SEM which enhanced 
competition. Therefore, the outcome of this framework led to increased competitive 
interactions in both industries of this study. 
The following years are characterized by volatile fluctuations as 1998 is considered to 
be the year over which the industry was operating according to perfect competition. However, 
2000-2001 is a period exerting increased price markups as a result of the new currency. As in 
the case of the manufacturing industry, the service sectors tried to acquire more profits 
through the exploitation of consumer surplus due to the increased level of Purchasing Power 
Parity. In 2002 the markup ratio temporarily fell, only to increase over 2003-2004 because of 
the hosting of the Olympic Games. A temporary fall is also observed in 2005 but 
subsequently, the markup trend tends to increase given the conditions of the aggregate 
economy that allowed for imperfect competitive conduct to persist.  
The empirical findings suggest that the pricing decisions of the service industry were 
different compared to the ones of the manufacturing industry. An interpretation of this 
outcome may lie on the market power that each constituent sector possesses. In general, the 
markup ratio of the manufacturing sectors is lower than the service sectors; however, there 
exist two service sectors that operate according to perfect competition. This means that even 
if the service industry exhibits a higher price-cost margin than the manufacturing industry, 
the pricing decisions of the constituent sectors may not be reflected by the aggregate value. 
Overall, the manufacturing and the service industries have been operating under 
imperfect competitive conditions over 1970-2007. The results obtained for both industries 
validate the presence of positive price-cost margins. However, the values across the 
manufacturing and service sectors are not similar to the ones obtained by Polemis (2014a, 
2014b, 2014c). An interpretation of this outcome may lie on the econometrics procedure and 
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the panel techniques employed in this study9. Moreover, the cross section and time series 
specification extend the analysis to the investigation of sectorial and annual industrial pricing 
behaviour. Consequently, the present study complements the argument that (i) the Greek 
manufacturing and service industries exert positive markup levels and (ii) the service industry 
is less competitive than the manufacturing industry. 
6. Conclusion 
This study extended the market power investigation in the Greek manufacturing and service 
industries by employing the markup model formulated by Hall (1988) and Roeger (1995). 
The results suggest that both industries appear to have positive price-cost margins over 1970-
2007. In addition, the constituent sectors exhibit a positive markup ratio with the exception of 
two service sectors (i.e. 66 and L) that set their selling price equal to the marginal cost of 
service provision. These suggestions are complemented by the annual markup values 
obtained for both industries at the aggregate level over 1973-2007. Consequently, it can be 
concluded that the Greek manufacturing and service industries operate under imperfect 
competitive conduct. 
 A possible remedy that would enhance the forces and incentives of competition in 
these industries might refer to the re-introduction of developmental and operational programs, 
as in 1993, that will contribute to the innovative and technological infrastructure of the Greek 
sectors. In particular, the European Commission (2012) is working on a policy framework for 
the European Union members under which domestic markets will achieve new levels of 
growth by developing fully integrated networks  that will enhance the economies overall. One 
of the most important factors that may contribute to this outcome is the enhancement of 
business environment by introducing opportunities for active and new entrepreneurs. 
A possible barrier that prevents such opportunities may refer to barriers to entry due 
to market power acquisition by the incumbent firms. According to IOBE (2014), the Greek 
business environment leaves little place for new firms to operate because of the presence of 
heavy regulation and monitoring imposed by oligopolistic firms. Consequently, barriers to 
entry in oligopolistic markets should be eliminated so that new entrepreneurs can start their 
business in the Greek manufacturing and service industries. 
                                                          
9 Polemis (2014b) suggests that the manufacturing markup on average is higher than the markup ratio of the 
service industry which contradicts the findings of the present study. 
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Moreover, the findings of this study complement the arguments of the OECD that the 
Greek economy and in particular, the manufacturing industry is under-performing (OECD 
2012, 2014). There are 555 problematic regulations identified where 329 of them could be 
improved by enhancing competition. This means that the Greek manufacturing industry is 
heavily regulated, thus constraining its efficiency and capacity that results in welfare losses 
and market power exploitation. The second report focuses on the sectors of beverages (i.e. 
11); textiles, clothing apparel and leather (i.e. 13, 14 and 15); machinery and equipment (i.e. 
28); and coke and refined petroleum products (i.e. 19). The findings are once again in favour 
of regulations that harm competition. This argument is validated by the positive price-cost 
margins presented in Table 2. As a result, the OECD makes 88 recommendations on 
improving legal frameworks by utilizing the EU legislation that minimizes barriers to entry 
and promotes incentives for innovation. 
To this end, innovation can be considered as a significant factor of competition 
through which firms will achieve economies of scale and diversify their products in order to 
enhance their sales. If innovation leads to this outcome, particular firms will gain competitive 
advantage against their competitors. When the same rationale is adopted by every market 
participant, the degree of imperfect competition will be reduced. Therefore, the Scumpeterian 
creative destruction will run its course by forcing inefficient and non-competitive firms to 
exit the market (Reinert and Reinert, 2006). 
Overall, the present study provides evidence of an imperfect competitive market 
structure in the Greek manufacturing and service industries. Future research could take into 
consideration more disaggregated data at a firm level and test the pattern of the price-cost 
margin of the manufacturing and service firms. Moreover, the same methodology can be 
applied in the economies of the European Union and investigate whether the markup ratios 
across countries appear to be correlated because of the SEM framework. As a result, the 
market structure in the European manufacturing and service sectors will be investigated over 
time and be compared to the imperfect competitive structure of the Greek sectors. 
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Appendix 
Table A: Classification of sectors according to ISIC Rev. 3 
15 Manufacture of food and beverages 
16 Manufacture of tobacco 
17 Manufacture of textiles 
18 Manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing And dying of fur 
19 Manufacture of leather, leather and footwear 
20 Manufacture of wood and of wood and cork 
21 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper 
22 Manufacture of printing, publishing and reproduction 
23 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 
24 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
25 Manufacture of rubber and plastics 
26 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral 
27 Manufacture of basic metals 
28 Manufacture of fabricated metal 
29 Manufacture of other machinery products 
30 Manufacture of office, accounting and computing machinery 
31 Manufacture of other electrical machinery and apparatus 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment 
33 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments 
34 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
36 Manufacture of other manufacturing products 
37 Manufacture of recycling 
50 Sector of sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles; retail sale of fuel 
51 Sector of wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
52 Sector of retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
repair of household goods 
H Sector of hotels and restaurants 
28 
 
60 Sector of inland transport 
61 Sector of water transport 
62 Sector of air transport 
63 Sector of supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of 
travel agencies 
64 Sector of post and telecommunications 
65 Sector of financial intermediation, except insurance and pension 
funding 
66 Sector of insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social 
security 
67 Sector of activities related to financial intermediation 
70 Sector of real estate activities 
71 Sector of renting of machinery and equipment 
72 Sector of computer and related activities 
73 Sector of research and development 
74 Sector of other business activities 
L Sector of public admin and defence; compulsory social security 
M Sector of education 
N Sector of health and social work 
O Sector of other community, social and personal service 
90 Sector of sewage and refuse disposal, sanitation and similar 
activities 
91 Sector of activities of membership organizations 
92 Sector of recreational, cultural and sporting activities 
93 Sector  of other service activities 
P Sector of private households with employed persons 
 
